FII GLO

I was having a bit of a think on the practical implications of the High Court decision in

Prudential Assurance Co Ltd & anr v Commissioners for HMRC EWHC 3249 (Ch).

 

As the likelihood is that the High Court decision will be appealed there's an argument for not worrying about this until the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have had their say. But I think there are some points that might need to be considered now.

 

1.  Documentation

Assuming for the moment that the High Court approach of providing relief for underlying tax but at the higher of the treaty rate or the nominal rate is upheld then being able to produce the relevant paperwork to support the appropriate nominal rate of tax will be important.  It is clear from the High Court judgement that Prudential were able to analyse their foreign income by country for each year of claim. It might be an idea for companies that have submitted claims for foreign dividends to be exempt to ensure that they can lay their hands on a similar analysis.  If its not possible to do this then a visit to the archives might be in order.

2.  Time Limits

The ECJ has now issued its judgement on the issue of whether FA 2004 section 320 is  consistent with EU law.  The judgement is that FA 2004 section 320 cannot be allowed to reduce the period of a mistake claim.  This link to Simmons and Simmons (You will have to sign up for their service) indicates that companies only have until 16th January 2014 to issue protective High Court claims before statutory changes bar claims.

Time Limits  

 

Might this allow companies to make claims for exemption for foreign dividends (or relief from underlying tax at nominal rates for periods where they had previously thought they were time barred from making claims?

 

3.  Recognition in accounts

 

With year end almost upon us companies will need to consider whether to recognise the High court decision in their 2013 accounts.  As far as I can see there are limited grounds for recognising the benefit.  IAS 37 prohibits the recognition of contingent assets that are defined as follows:   "contingent assets usually arise from unplanned or other unexpected events that give rise to the possibility of an inflow of economic benefits to the entity. An example is a claim that an entity is pursuing through legal processes, where the outcome is uncertain."

 

There is similar wording in UK GAAP.

 

Given the likelihood that HMRC will appeal the High Court decision and continue to claim that credit relief should be provided at the underlying rate but without the nominal relief provision included in the High Court judgement I don't think its possible to claim that there is no contingent element to the reclaim.  

 

There is however, a requirement to disclose contingents assets (by way of a note) where recovery is probable.  

 

4. Recognition in Policyholder Benefits  

The issue here is whether to recognise the benefit of claims for exemption for foreign dividends in the policyholder value of unit linked and with profit funds.  This is of course an issue that has existed since the start of the FII GLO but the High Court decision has brought in into focus.  From a theoretical view I think the correct position is that some credit should be given to policyholders.  That is the chances of overall success in the litigation must be greater than 0% so there is an asset.  That asset should be recognised in policyholder funds to ensure inter generational equity for policyholders.  

 

Having said that there are practical reasons to not recognise; most importantly recognising the value of exemption in policyholder assets and then clawing that value back in the event of a future court decision is likely to cause a terrible stink.

 

5.  Collective Investments 

 

I am struggling to see how investment in a foreign collective such a Luxembourg SICAV would fit in to the High Court decision. Luxembourg does tax corporate profits but not return accruing to a SICAV.  So is the nominal rate 0% or the Luxembourg CT rate?  Assuming for the moment that the 0% rate is the nominal rate (No idea is this is the right answer just an assumption) then underlying credit rules do allow you to go down a chain of holdings in calculating underlying tax.Link to HMRC manual.

 

But this just takes us back to point 1 what documentation do you need to evidence the nominal underlying tax on the dividends received by the SICAV?  

 

 

 

Loan Relationship Consultation

HMRC have now published the summary of responses to the Modernising the taxation of corporate debt and derivative contracts consultation document.

LR Condoc Responses

In general the document does exactly what it says on the tin: it summarizes the responses to the original consultation document and commits to further consultation with a view to legislation in Finance Act 2015.

A welcome development is that HMRC have backed down from the initial proposals for bond funds.  The key paragraph is 13.12 reproduced below.

"In the light of this, HMRC has been exploring with stakeholders, and continues

to do so, a less radical approach, which will retain the bond fund rules, while addressing both the tax avoidance issues and some of the difficulties with the operation of the test for identifying a bond fund. As set out in the consultation document, it is intended that changes in this area will be included in Finance Bill 2014."

 

The clauses to be included in Finance Act 2014 are (scheduled) to be released in January. 

 

It probably shows a lack of imagination on my part but I'm at a loss to see how bond funds could be used in a tax avoidance scheme.  I wonder if an anti avoidance provision is really needed in this area?  If avoidance was a clear and present danger then I suspect we would have had legislation already rather than waiting for the Finance Act.

On corporate streaming the position is less clear cut.  The final paragraph on this is as follows.

"The Government notes the issues raised and intends to explore further with

stakeholders implications arising from the identified options before determining

the way forward. It is expected that any changes in this area can be implemented by way of secondary legislation under existing regulation-making powers conferred on HM Treasury"

 

So really a question of watch this space but I think HMRC may be moving away from outright abolition of streaming.  

 

One pet peeve that I have is that HMRC keep referring to the corporate streaming provisions as anti avoidance legislation.  But this simply isn't the case, if it was anti avoidance legislation then it would be worded as such.  Of course the key consideration in HMRC's (collective) mind when the legislation was instigated was the need to prevent investment via an AIF turning taxable income into FII but that's not the same thing (parliament passes legislation not HMRC).  Corporate streaming provides continuity of treatment to the tax system and is beneficial both for tax payers and HMRC.

 

Pet peeve aside its good to see HMRC has paid attention to industry representations on the bond fund point and hopefully we are headed in the same direction on streaming.

 

French Dividends Paid to OEICs

An update to my post of 11 July on this topic.  One of my clients has pointed out to me that the French fiscal authorities have now issued guidance on how UCITs can obtain a 0% rate of French withholding tax.

More information can be found in the link below

http://www.pwc.lu/French_withholding

(There's a rather better note from Ashurst Paris that I can't link to but you should be able to google)

As far as I am aware it is not possible for a life company investing in French equities to obtain the 0% rate via this UCITs route.  There might be a case in European law that UK linked pension business holdings should not suffer French withholding tax at 15% but such claims seem to be hard to enforce in practise.

Accordingly,linked pension business investment in French assets via a UCIT will obtain a better rate of withholding than direct investment in equities.  This is of course the reverse of the position for Dutch, German, Swiss and Belgium equities where direct pension business  investment obtains a lower rate of withholding than investing via a UCIT.

A tax transparent fund holding collectives investing in France (and maybe Italy) but having direct investments in other European markets might square the circle but whether the cost or complexity involved would be worthwhile is unclear.

QROPs HMRC statement of practice

An update to my post of 24 August 2013.  HMRC has issued "Guidance for individuals, pension schemes and advisers on the taxation of unauthorised transfers to schemes included on the QROPS list"

The guidance is here

QROPS Guidance

In summary the guidance provides that no unauthorised payments charge will be levied on transfers taking place before 24 September 2008 to a scheme included on the QROPS list  where the transferor has taken the listing as assurance that the scheme qualified as a QROPs.

For transfers after 24 September 2008 to schemes on the QROPs list that transpire not to have been QROPs the situation is rather unclear and the guidance states,

"HMRC will consider whether to exercise its collection and management powers on the particular facts of the case in the light of the principle of conspicuous unfairness mentioned above."

I still think the only way to deal with this is for HMRC to do more vetting of QROPs in advance of their names being published on the QROPs list so that instances of non  - qualifying schemes being listed become negligible.

One curio is that HMRC refer to the guidance being issued in response to R (Gibson) v Commissioner for HM Revenue and Customs but a search of my tax cases for this drew a blank.  I wonder if its the official name of ROSIIP judicial review?

Prudential Assurance Co Ltd and Ors v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2013] EWHC 3249 (Ch)

I've just read through the actual judgement on this see

High Court Decision

Not a light read but looking at the detail I think the judgement is much better for life companies than I originally thought.

Obviously the best position would have been for the High Court to have decided that foreign portfolio dividends were exempt from tax.  Justice Henderson, however decided that exemption was not appropriate and that instead the claimants should obtain credit relief for  underlying tax.  See paragraphs 103 and 104 of the judgement.

But reading the judgement it seems that although the claimants are receiving relief for underlying tax its not underlying tax as we know it.  Instead it seems to be the one of two amounts.  Firstly underlying tax calculated on usual principles, that is you need to know how much tax the company paying the dividend suffered on the profits giving rise to the dividend.  And secondly underlying tax at the nominal rate i.e. the mainstream rate of corporation tax in the country paying the dividend.

This idea of underlying tax being calculated at the nominal rate seems to be derived from the Haribo case and the argument is that a credit system is only equivalent with a exemption system where the underlying tax that is included in the credit calculation is at the nominal rate.  An example might help to illustrate.  Say the mainstream corporation tax rate in a country is 30% and a company receiving the dividend is taxed at this rate.  But say the company paying the dividend only pays tax at 20%.  In an exemption system the tax suffered on the dividend is 20, in an underlying tax credit system giving relief for actual tax the tax is 30 as the tax is topped up to the 30% rate when the receiving company accounts for the dividend.  In an underlying tax credit system with nominal rates the tax is 20 as it is assumed that the paying company was taxed at the full rate so there is no top up.

But as per paragraphs 95 and 96 of the judgement despite the availability of relief for underlying tax based on a nominal tax rate a UK company is still able to claim credit relief for underlying tax at the actual rate if this is higher than credit relief calculated on a nominal basis.  But the total credit for foreign tax including any withholding tax is limited to the UK tax paid on the dividend.

So say there is a dividend of £100 that has suffered withholding tax of nil.  The nominal rate of tax in the country paying the dividend is 20%, the actual tax  on profits for the dividend paying company is £10 and the UK tax on the dividend is 35.  Then the credit relief is the lower of the UK tax on the dividend and the higher of the nominal tax or the actual tax.  In this case the tax credit is 20 (as nominal is 20 which is higher than the actual which is less than the UK tax on the dividend).  But in most cases the underlying tax will be  greater than the UK tax so effective exemption.

In my first post on this topic I suggested that the judge may not have fully appreciated all of the practicalities of establishing a claim for credit relief.  This was most unfair as quite a lot of the judgement is on the practical issues .  On the nominal element of credit relief Mr Justice Henderson makes it clear that a light touch is the order of the day. He approves the approach adopted by the Prudential which was to use publicly available data to establish a tax rate for each dividend paying country and then use that tax rate to calculate the nominal underlying tax.  This part of the decision is at paragraph 111 and includes the following wording 

"I do not think it would be reasonable to expect perfect accuracy; and if there are any minor imperfections in the tables, it would in my judgment better accord with the EU principle of effectiveness to use the flawed figures rather than reject them entirely or insist on yet further investigations"

However, on the issue of underlying credit relief for actual tax the decision is a lot tougher and essentially prohibits companies from taking any shortcuts.  In practical terms this would make it pretty much impossible to support a claim for actual underlying tax as it requires the cooperation of the company paying the dividend.

So in summary I would say the decision is.  

• No exemption for foreign dividends.  
• But relief for underlying tax.  
• Underlying tax is equal to  the greater of a nominal basis or an actual basis 
• But subject to the limit that credit relief cannot exceed UK tax payable on dividend.
• And in practice it would be near impossible to claim credit relief for actual underlying tax

The decision also looks at a number of insurance specific issues.  These are as follows.

• Treatment of foreign dividends in FA 89 section 89 calculation (paragraph 133 - 135 of judgement).  

That is can the shareholders share of foreign dividends referable to BLAGAB be used to reduce the NC1 profit? The judgement is yes they can but this relief is by credit rather than exemption.  I'm at a bit of a loss to see what exactly this means.  Might it be like this.

Say foreign income 100.

Foreign tax available for credit 30.

I-E profit 1,000

NC1 result 50.

UK tax shareholder profits 30%

UK ax policyholder 20%

Then foreign credit is limited to UK tax  = 50/1000*100*30% = 1.5 + 950/1000*100*20% = 19.

So credit relief is £20.5

• Ability to make additional section 242 claims

The judgement was that such claims could not be altered to include foreign dividends see paragraph 143 of the judgement.

Elections under 438 (6) ICTA

That is could the claimants elect for the shareholders share of dividends attributable to pension business to be exempted from inclusion in the pension business business computation.  The judgement is that the treatment of such dividends is discriminatory but that relief should be available by way of credit relief rather than exemption.  As with the FA 89 section 89 point above not quite sure how this work in practice.

Paragraph 156 of the judgement also covers third country portfolio dividends which includes the following "I can see no reason to exclude any third countries from the relief sought by the claimants"

Paragraphs 162 onwards of the judgement concerns remedies.  I've nothing very useful to say about this; except that the Revenue seems to have lost on all substantive points.

 

ABI Guide of Good Practice for unit linked funds

I'm just starting a piece of work for a client looking at  tax in unit pricing policies and documentation in the light of TR 13/8 and the ABI reissued "A guide of good practice for unit linked funds" ("The Guide").   I've been reading through the Guide to get a feel for what constitutes good practice.  What follows is my summary of what the I think the Guide is saying and a few suggestions on what I think the implications are.

Probably the most important point to note is the Guide's brevity.  It is only 24 pages long (and that includes title pages indexes chapter breaks etc).  It is not telling firms what to do but rather setting out general principles.  Accordingly it is necessary to read through the Guide as a whole rather than just concentrating on the tax sections.

The forward, introduction and status sections of the guide set out how companies operating unit linked funds should apply the principles in the guide.  This includes the following.

The FSA has indicated that it will take account of the standards set out in this Guide in their supervision of unit linked offices (see para 1.1.4) 

The Guide is aspirational: it is something companies should work towards.

But in some cases products sold in the past may not be able to meet the good practice guidelines owing to the materiality of the issues, the disproportionate costs, or contractual constraints. (see paragraph 1.0.02)

However, if a company does not meet the guidelines then it should document the non  - compliance and why this is acceptable. (paragraph 1.0.03)

It is recognized that some of the guidelines may not be appropriate for institutional unit linked companies (1.1.5).

Section 2 of the Guide covers fund governance and policyholder documentation and communication.  

The individual policy conditions should define  the boundaries within which a

company has agreed to operate its unit linked funds.  Tax is specifically mentioned as an area that should be documented in this way. (paragraph 2.1.9).

Where this information has not been set out in individual policy conditions, then firms must ensure that they make such information readily available to their customers. 

Taken together, all the information provided (or made available) to customers should enable them to understand how the firm operates the fund and manages their investments.  (Paragraphs 2.1.10 and 2.1.11)

Comment : Many unit linked firm's include wording in their policy terms that the unit linked fund will be taxed as if it were a stand alone company.  I do not believe this allows customers to understand how the firm operates and manages the fund, (unless the customer has a good working knowledge of I-E tax.)  I think companies should be making a fuller disclosure of how the fund is taxed.

Section 3 of the Guide is on the use of discretion

The Guide requires that where discretion is applied this should be on the basis of  published criteria and standards. (3.1.2).  The calculation of tax including deferred provisions are specifically mentioned as being areas where discretion is applied.  As is the the taking of charges for tax  from (or applying credits to)  the fund. (3.1.6).

Section 4 of the document is about operating standards including pricing issues.

As a general principle wherever possible processes and decisions should be documented by the firm with relevant information made available both to the regulator and to policyholders. (4.01).  I think this confirms the need for information to be provided to policyholders beyond a "we tax the fund as a stand alone company."

4.1.1 of the guide sets out two basic principles to be applied in pricing.

The pricing mechanism should not be used as a deliberate means of extracting value from the fund or from policyholders, and

Cross subsidy among policyholders or individual funds should be minimised as far as reasonably possible.

Its easy to read over the "not be used as a deliberate means of extracting value from the fund or policyholders" but taken at face value it is quite radical.  After all an annual management charge is an explicit extraction from policyholder assets to fund shareholder costs and provide a profit. However, a footnote provides  clarification that this does not prevent the proper application of disclosed management charges and fees.

Comment 1 Notwithstanding the footnote, I still think the reference to extracting value is potentially quite a far reaching statement.  At one time it was common for insurers to operate unit linked funds on the basis that no credit would be given in the unit price for CGT losses when the fund was in a net loss position.  This policy would still be followed when the company as a whole had net CGT gains due to the "taxed as a stand alone company" policy.  However, in these circumstances the stand alone company is effectively lending its CGT losses to the shareholder at a 0% interest rate.   The question is, is that an extraction of value? 

In the absence of a clear statement in the unit pricing policy I  think it is  - if the fund is to be taxed as stand alone company then shouldn't that stand alone company expect a fee for the loan of its tax assets?  Also the failure to pay for the loan of losses would not be disclosed to the policyholder.  I guess the contrary view is that the use of its losses does not make the fund any worse off so is not extracting any value but I know which side of the argument I would like to be on.

Comment 2 Although the need for equity between groups of policyholders is established some companies have unit pricing polices where credit stops being provided for CGT losses when the fund is in a net loss position.  It is hard to reconcile this with equity between groups of policyholders.  A policyholder may leave a fund in a net loss position and not receive  any value for CGT losses that then accrue to future policyholders when the value of the fund increases.  Clearly there is a point at which a fund has so many CGT losses that an additional pound of loss has no value but its hard to see any justification for that point being reached in one fell swoop when the fund moves in to a net loss position. .

Sections 4.5.9 - 4.5.11 are specific tax sections.  As these are quite short I have reproduced them below.

.

4.5.9 Where the fund is subject to tax the following principles should apply: 

 

Policyholders should be treated fairly.

 

The firm's approach to tax should be consistent with marketing

literature and policy documentation. The firm, if appropriate,

should amend marketing literature and policy documentation

when changes in tax regimes arise

.

The firm should document how its chosen basis of taxation

meets its aims, including if appropriate broad equity between

generations of policyholders and fairness between the company

and the fund.

 

4.5.10 The following factors should be considered when choosing its basis of taxation

 

 The impact of tax balances in the fund as these can distort the

risk profile of the fund (e.g. through gearing).

 

Ensure consistency with current tax rates and tax regime (with

changes being implemented from the effective date of the

change, unless equity demands otherwise).

 

Place an appropriate value on deferred tax assets and liabilities.

 

The firm should ensure that the value of the fund takes account

of any appropriate tax relief attributable to asset classes held in

the fund.

 

The need for procedures that are operationally robust, bearing

in mind that taxation deals with future events whose outcome is uncertain.

 

 4.5.11 The scope and nature of the taxation of unit linked life funds may be

subject to change over time, but wherever possible announcements of

future changes should be taken into account in any tax calculations.

 

Comment 1 The Guide is clear that tax deductions in unit pricing should be consistent with policyholder documentation.  Accordingly I think it is saying that except in exceptional cases what is in the documentation trumps any abstract notion of fairness.

 

Comment 2 The gearing point is interesting but I'm not 100% sure what it refers to.  I think it would be a situation where a fund has assets of £100 and  a tax liability of £10.  In these circumstances the unit linked policyholder has an investment of 90 but backed by assets of 100 and a liability of 10.  Therefore the policyholder has, potentially an exposure of more than 100% to market movements.

Comment 3 The need to place an appropriate value on deferred tax assets is quite vague but I think it supports the need to do away with the "cliff edge" where CGT losses go from being valued at 20% to 0%.

 

Section 5 of the document is on fund launches, mergers and closures and at 5.2.2 lists tax as one of the factors that should be taken into consideration when deciding whether to merge or close funds.

 

Final Comment The Code is good at setting out overarching principles for operating and pricing unit linked funds.   However, it offers little in terms of specific guidance for charging tax to unit linked funds.  For companies with robust TCF procedures the lack of rules will allow them to develop policies that take account of their particular circumstances.  Unfortunately for other companies the lack of firm guidance just provides room to wriggle away from policyholder commitments.  

 

Accordingly although I expect there to be continued improvements in tax in unit pricing tax to provide greater  equity between policyholder and shareholder and groups of policyholders I think that there will be a wide range of policies followed and some companies will cling to established but inappropriate polices. 

If there is a single theme running through the document it is the need to articulate, document and communicate unit pricing policies in a way that can be understood by customers and the regulator.

 

.
 

Unauthorised Unit Trusts

Just a quick update to my post of 30 September 2013.  SI 2013 2819 setting out the new legislation for unauthorised unit trusts has now been signed.  The legislation comes in to force from 6th April 2014 other than part 1 of the SI ( application for tax exempt status) and chapter 1 of part 4 (transitional regime) that have immediate effect.

The SI can be found at

si 2013 2819

Reinsurance of BLAGAB business

I recently received a query from a client on the tax implications of reinsuring BLAGAB business from an unconnected company.  I was aware that HMRC had been looking to amend the regulations on this point but this seems to have run into the buffers and SI 1995/1730 is still used to calculate the investment return that is treated as accruing to the cedant.

It is unfortunate that there has been no movement on this point as SI 1995/1730 was always rather unsatisfactory.  It was complicated to operate and could result in more I-E tax being payable than would be the case if the reinsurance had not been entered into. (As there was no allowance for indexation on gains etc).  I also thought the calculation was potentially vulnerable to tax avoidance arrangements - although the fact that the methodology has been place since 1995 - pretty much unchanged - suggests this is not the case.

I would have thought that you could sweep si 1995/1730 away in its entirety.

That is FA 2012 now reads

"90(2)  For the purposes of the I – E rules the investment return on the policy or contract is treated as accruing to the company while the risk remains reinsured by the company under the re-insurance arrangement.

90(3)  The investment return that is treated as accruing to the company–"

Could you then insert.  "Where assets are transferred by the cedant to the reinsurer the investment return referred to section 90 (3) is equal to the taxable income and capital gains arising on those transferred assets.

Where there is no transfer of assets to the reinsurer by the cedant or assets are deposited back to the cedant the investment return is equal to any interest payable on the premium withheld or deposit back amount."

And problem solved.  Where companies don't want the faff of calculating taxable investment income and capital gains on an exact basis they could always agree something sensible with HMRC up front.

Probably not a big point as I suspect third party reinsurance of BLAGAB business would be a fairly infrequent event regardless of the tax rules.  (My client quickly realized there was a whole range of non  - tax reasons for not proceeding).  But there are circumstances where reinsurance is a useful tool and best if the tax rules are clear and don't get in the way of commercial transactions. 

Prudential Assurance Co Ltd and Ors v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2013] EWHC 3249 (Ch)

The High Court judgement in the above case has been released.  The brief CCH summary of the case highlights that the tax payer won on the ACT and interest points (i.e. should repayment interest be calculated on a simple or a compound basis)

A copy of the decision is at 

Prudential Assurance Co Ltd and Ors v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2013] EWHC 3249 (Ch)

What strikes me about the decision is that it seems as if the tax payer lost on the question of the treatment of portfolio dividends.  I've reproduced the relevant part of the judgement below.

"Equal treatment of foreign dividends could therefore be achieved by granting a credit based on the foreign nominal rate but capped at the UK policyholder rate. Since section 790 already provided for the grant of tax credits, in the case of both portfolio and non-portfolio dividends, the grant of a further tax credit for portfolio dividends would not go against the grain of the UK tax legislation. Nor would it require the court to make policy decisions for which it was not equipped because the sole purpose of the tax credit would be to secure compliance with authority from the Court of Justice of the European Union in which the UK tax system has been held to infringe article 63. In reaching that conclusion, Henderson J accepted the revenue’s submission that a conforming interpretation was possible and that it was therefore unnecessary for the Case V charge on portfolio dividends to be disapplied in cases where it infringed article 63. Henderson J went on to conclude on the issue that (a) the test claimants failed on the facts to prove their entitlement to a tax credit for the underlying tax actually paid; (b) that failure involved no breach by the UK of the principle of effectiveness; and (c) there was therefore no reason either to disapply the requirement of proof, or to grant a tax credit at the nominal rate as a proxy."

What I think this is saying is that although it is against EU law for BLAGAB foreign portfolio dividends to be taxed under schedule D case V this can be remedied by providing credit relief relief for the underlying tax on the portfolio dividends rather than just treating the dividend as exempt and in this case the tax payer failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the claim.

I've no comment on the legal aspects of the judgement but it seems clear to me that it was inappropriate for HMRC to advance the credit relief argument.  As HMRC is at the coal face of the tax compliance process it is aware that it is difficult to calculate and document claims for underlying tax for significant holdings and where the information is relatively fresh. For portfolio holdings from prior years this will be a very time consuming process and may just be flat out impossible.  However, some judges may be unaware of these practical issues.  HMRC is attempting to make EU law inoperable and the people bearing the cost are, by and large, with profits policyholders.

Life insurance companies could look to establish what information they would have for underlying credit relief claims   I suspect HMRC will just reject any such claims sending the question of what is sufficient evidence to the FTT and back into the judicial morass. However submitting withholding tax claims might put some pressure on HMRC. 

As a big picture point I feel some sort of insurance company, FCA, HMRC settlement might be the best answer, see post of 14th June.